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《 論　　説 》
Top Global Soft Power? 
Japanese Higher Education and Foreign Policy Goals
H. Steven Green
Introduction
　Can governments use the internationalization of their nationʼs higher education sys-
tem as an instrument for foreign policy? University education affects and creates 
knowledge, and spreads ideas around the world. At universities, studentsʼ opinions and 
critical thinking skills often take shape and determine how they will see the world for 
the rest of their lives. In these ways, tertiary education is an “international force（ １ ）” 
and, as such, can become an important part of a countryʼs reputation. The output of its 
university system can raise a nationʼs global profile. International students who enjoy 
their studies often return to their home countries with strong positive feelings toward 
the country in which they earned their degree. 
　As competition among universities becomes more international, some governments 
have started to to play an active role in trying to globalize their countryʼs higher educa-
tion system. In 2014 the government of Japan announced that its Top Global University 
project would award annual subsidies to raise the internationalization efforts, and glob-
al rankings, of 37 selected universities. （Disclosure: The writer is employed by a des-
ignated Top Global University （TGU）. All opinions and analyses expressed in this es-
（ 1）　Philip G. Altbach and Patti McGill Peterson, “Higher Education as a Projection of Americaʼs Soft Pow-
er,” Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, Watanabe Yas-
ushi and David L. McConnell, eds., New York: M.E. Sharpe （2008） p. 37
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say are the writerʼs own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Toyo University or 
MEXT.） This essay creates a framework for thinking about the Top Global University 
project as a soft power resource to help the Japanese government achieve its foreign 
policy goals. 
International Higher Education Competition and Japan
　“The world is going to university（ 2 ）.” By 2012, the global share of the student-age 
population enrolled in tertiary-education institutions reached 32％ , up from 14％ twen-
ty years earlier, and in 54 countries the ratio was above half（ ３ ）. Growing middle classes 
and higher rates of education in developing nations generate international student 
flows. Data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics （UIS） illustrate two key trends 
in international higher education- an increase in the number of students willing to study 
in another country and growing competition for them from outside the wealthiest na-
tions. According to the latest UIS report on global flows of higher education enroll-
ments, in 2013 over 4．1 million students, equal to 1．8％ of all higher education enroll-
ment worldwide, chose to pursue degrees overseas（ ４ ）. As the number of 18-year-olds in 
the wealthy countries continues to decline, universities seek international students to 
fill out their enrollment quotas and budgets. In 2013, 50％ of all so-called mobile stu-
dents went to one of five countries - the US （19％）, UK （10％）, Australia （ 6 ％）, 
France （ 6 ％） and Germany （ 5 ％）. However, the top fiveʼs share of students has de-
creased, from 56 ％ in 2000（ ５ ）, due to the growing popularity of universities in other 
（ 2）　“The world is going to university,” The Economist, March 28, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21647285-more-and-more-money-being-spent-higher-education-too-little-known-about-whether-it 
（Downloaded 06/28/2016 at 12:15 Japan Standard Time JST）
（ 3）　Ibid.
（ 4）　“Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics （UIS）, March 2 , 2016 http://
www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx （Downloaded on 06/28/2016 at 
12:48 JST）
（ 5）　Both sets of figures from Ibid.
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countries. China, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and New Zealand attracted 7 ％ 
of the worldwide share of mobile students while Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE at-
tracted 4 ％ . 
　As competition among universities has become global so have university rankings. 
According to Ellen Hazelkorn, advisor to Irelandʼs Higher Education Authority, the at-
tention of university and political leaders has shifted from national- to international 
rankings（ 6 ）. In the world top 200 spots of The Times Higher Education （THE） World 
University Rankings 2016, 28 nations are represented this year. As might be expected, 
the institutions from the top five destinations cited above take the lionʼs share of spots, 
in particular those from the US, UK and Germany. The US leads with 53 schools in the 
top 200, followed by the UK （34）, Germany （20）, Australia （ 8 ） and France （ 5 ）. 
Outside the top five destination countries, and arguably noteworthy for punching above 
their weight （such as Australia does）, 7  schools in Canada and 21 in China are ranked 
in the world top 200（ ７ ）. 
　Unfortunately for anyone with a vested interest in Japanʼs higher education system, 
this yearʼs THE rankings do not contain good news. The nation has just two institutions 
in the top 200; The University of Tokyo （43） and Kyoto University （88.） Reflecting 
shifts in the balance of economic power in Asia, The University of Tokyo is not even 
the No. 1  ranked university in the continent anymore, but has been replaced by the 
National University of Singapore. Various explanations try to make sense of Japanʼs 
underwhelming performance in global rankings including changes in citation practices, 
belt-tightening of public university budgets, promotion practices and “ingrained struc-
tural weaknesses（ 8 ）.” 
（ 6）　“Top Class,” The Economist, March 28, 2015 http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21646987-
competition-among-universities-has-become-intense-and-international-top-class （Downloaded on 
05/21/2016 at 10:48 JST）
（ 7）　Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2015⊖16, Sept. 30, 2015 https://www.
timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2016/world-ranking#!/page/ 0 /length/25/sort_by/
rank_label/sort_order/asc/cols/rank_only （Downloaded on 6 /27/2016 at 05:55 JST）
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　Rankings are important not only for the esteem of university official and politicians, 
but also because, according to Hazelkorn, they “force institutions and governments to 
question their standards. They are a driver of behavior and change（ 9 ）.” In an age of 
both increased global student mobility and transnational competition for fee-paying 
students, no countryʼs leaders wish to see their nationʼs tertiary education institutions 
lose prestige. As will be shown below, concern about rankings certainly drove the deci-
sion by the administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to commit nearly JPY 8  bil-
lion over the next ten years to help three dozen Japanese universities globalize and 
raise their international ranking.
The Top Global University Project
　Under Prime Minister Abe, Japanʼs government has proposed bold plans and com-
mitted billions of yen to internationalizing Japanese universities and raising their global 
profile. In 2013, he publicly set a target of having 10 Japanese universities ranked 
among the top 100 schools worldwide by 2020（１0）. A year later, Japanʼs education min-
istry （Ministry for Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology （MEXT） un-
veiled its plan to reward 37 public and private universities （chosen from 104 that ap-
plied） with financial support “to enhance the international compatibility and 
competiveness of higher education in Japan（１１）.” Each selected school has been granted 
（ 8）　“US dominance wanes in the World University Rankings 2015⊖16,”  Ibid. https://www.
timeshighereducation.com/news/big-beasts-strive-to-thrive-in-shifting-environment （Downloaded on 
06/28/2016 at 16:01 JST）
（ 9）　Op. cit., “Top Class”
（10）　Suvendri Kakuchi, “Abeducation ― A new push for higher education internationalization,” University 
World News, June 27, 2013 http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130627113411208 
（Downloaded on 06/28/2016 at 18:10 JST）
（11）　All figures and quotes in this paragraph come from Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology, Japan, “Selection for the FY 2014 Top Global University Project,” Press Release, September 
2014 http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/26/09/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/10/07/1352218_02.pdf 
（Downloaded on 06/25/2016 at 14:19 JST）
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the status of スーパーグローバル大学 （ sūpā gurōbaru daigaku , “super global uni-
versity”）, but officially dubbed “Top Global University” in English. The TGU project 
has two tiers- Type A （Top Type） and Type B （Global Traction Type）. Type A schools 
are considered “world class universities that have the potential to be ranked in the top 
100 in world university rankings,” while Type B schools are recognized as “innovative 
universities that lead the internationalization of Japanese society, based on continuous 
improvement of their current efforts.” The total budget is JPY7．7 billion for ten con-
secutive years （beginning in 2015.） The amount awarded to each school varies, but 
Type A institutions will receive more than Type B universities. The projectʼs general 
goals include “Structural change to form globally competitive universities in the 
world,” and “Stimulate cooperation with world class universities.” Specific goals in-
clude “Improving ratio of foreign faculty and students,” and “Increasing lectures in 
English.” 
　Japan is not the only, or the first, country to make a national project out of raising the 
international profile of its tertiary education system. One university president claims 
Germanyʼs relative strength in the THE World University Rankings this year is due to a 
combination of increased spending and the fruits of Berlinʼs Excellenzintiative of 2005, 
which has similar goals to the TGU project（１2）. Moscowʼs Project 5 ⊖100 was launched 
in 2012 to propel at least five universities into the world top 100 by 2020（１３）. Other sim-
ilar examples include Chinaʼs 985 project （1998） and former French president Nicolas 
Sarkozyʼs plan to create a “Sorbonne league,” that would rival the Ivy League （2011）
（１４）. Nor is TGU the first attempt by national bureaucrats to guide Japanʼs university 
system in a particular direction. Brian McVeigh outlines four distinct periods of state-
（12）　Ellie Bothwell, “New faces take a seat at extended top table,” Times Higher Education World University 
Rankings, Sept. 30. 2015 https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/new-faces-take-a-seat-at-extended-
top-table （Downloaded on 06/29/2016 at 20:57 JST）
（13）　Ibid.
（14）　Op. Cit., “Top of the Class”
東洋法学　第60巻第 1 号（2016年 7 月） 9３
（2５8）
university relations since 1945（１５）. From 1945⊖55 relations between Tokyo and private 
universities were formalized, concurrent with the establishment of bureaus within the 
Ministry of Education. During the years of the most-rapid growth, 1956⊖74, the state 
developed distinct concepts of “manpower development” and “human resource utiliza-
tion” that were handed down to universities as necessary goals of education and have 
continued into the present. McVeigh claims a 1962 white paper on education as the first 
official statement that education policy should be subordinate to economic policy. The 
period 1975⊖82 brought about a change in Tokyoʼs attitude toward private universities 
from “ʻno support, no controlʼ” to “ʻsupport and controlʼ” of them based on a 1975 law 
that authorized subsidization of private schools. Finally, the period from 1983 to the 
present （or, at least, to 2005, when McVeigh published this analysis） was characterized 
by the creation of new bureaus within the Ministry of Education/MEXT to oversee uni-
versities. 
　The primary goal of Japanʼs policy toward all levels of education has always been 
the development of “human resources （人 材, jinzai）,” ready to be trained and adjust 
quickly to the demands of Japanese industry. Acknowledging that, “education is tied to 
economic development everywhere,” McVeigh argues that Tokyoʼs education policy, in 
particular, is deeply interwoven with the interests of Japanese business （to the point of 
being determined by them） in its demand for universities to prepare jinzai（１6）. In the 
early part of this century, the concept jinzai has been modified into “global human re-
sources” （グローバル人材, gurōbaru jinzai）. The term has become a buzzword― a 
Google search of the Japanese-language version of the term yielded over 3  million 
references at the time of writing. Popular and academic understanding of the term 
（15）　All dates and key facts in remainder of paragraph are from Brian McVeigh, “Higher Education and the 
Ministry: The Capitalist Development State, Strategic Schooling and Revionism,” The ‘Big Bang’ in Japa-
nese Higher Education, J.S. Eades, Roger Goodman, Yumiko Hada, （Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press）, 
2005, pp.84⊖88
（16）　Ibid., p.85
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seems to be based on a definition provided in a report by a committee overseeing in-
dustry-university partnership in 2010（１７）. The 2010 report identified three core compe-
tencies necessary for global jinzai in an increasingly globalized business world. These 
are: communication skills in a foreign language （particularly in English）, ability to un-
derstand and take advantage of different cultures, and fundamental competencies for 
working persons. In 2011, under the direction of an advisory council（１8）, the definition 
of global jinzai was adjusted to: 
　　Factor I: Linguistic and communication skills
　　Factor II:  Self-direction and positiveness, a spirit for challenge, cooperativeness 
and flexibility, a sense of responsibility and mission
　　Factor III: Understanding of other cultures and a sense of identity as a Japanese（１9）
　As the language of these factors shows, the government ties the idea of global hu-
man resources to national goals for economic success. These goals are broad and have 
behind them a long history of state- and business cooperation in policy-formation. 
（McVeighʼs and Yonezawaʼs summary of this history are both recommended for learn-
ing this history.） 
　This essay proposes that the 2014 launch of the TGU project marks the start of a 
fifth phase of higher education guidance from Tokyo. It argues that Factor III above 
represents an implicit foreign policy goal within the governmentʼs global jinzai con-
cept. The next section will consider how TGU is part of the Abe administrationʼs 
（17）　Yonezawa Akiyoshi, “Japanʼs Challenge of Fostering ʻGlobal Human Resourcesʼ: Policy Debates and 
Practices,” Japan Labor Review, vol. 11, no. 2 , Spring 2014, p. 37.  Yonezawa is an excellent source for a 
detailed, thorough review of the “global jinzai” term and its origins.   The committee mentioned in the text 
is the Global Human Resource Development Committee of the Industry-Academia Partnership for Human 
Resource Development （2010） and was jointly released by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
（METI） and MEXT.  
（18）　The Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development, established in 2011, and 
comprising the Chief Cabinet Secretary and five ministers. Ibid., p.37
（19）　Reproduced from Ibid., p.39.    
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broader plan to increase Japanʼs soft power resources.
Soft Power and the Top Global University Project 
　Joseph S. Nye, Jr. invented the concept of soft power to explain phenomena that the 
conventional notion of hard power could not（20）. Hard power emphasizes statesʼ use of 
threats （e.g. military force, sanctions） and rewards （e.g. military assistance, market 
access） to get other actors in the international system to do what they would otherwise 
not do. The idea of soft power, on the other hand, is based on attraction. Rather than 
coercing others, soft power is based on coopting those who want to emulate the politi-
cal or social values, or cultural products, represented by the state. If hard power is get-
ting others do what you want, soft power is getting others to want what you want. Oth-
er people feel sympathetic to, or even fond of another nation, through commerce, 
culture and personal exchange. Therefore, a government may foster soft power as a re-
source by supporting business, cultural products and exchanges of people in all walks 
of life. The Top Global project is an attempt to promote Japanʼs soft power through ex-
change. To understand TGU as part of a policy for soft power, it is worth considering 
briefly two other government programs with implicit goals to promote sympathy and 
understanding for Japan. 
　In 2014 Tokyo launched the “Cool Japan” campaign to promote the global expansion 
of Japanese creative industries, and the values they supposedly carry with them. The 
campaignʼs name is based on American journalist Douglas McGrayʼs proposal that 
“Gross National Cool（2１）” become a measure for Japanʼs new source for worldwide in-
fluence. He believes that Japanʼs pop culture represents an excellent opportunity for Ja-
pan to attract people around the world to its foreign policy goals and “regain the role it 
（20）　Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, （New York: Public Affairs, 
2004）, Kindle edition 
（21）　Michal Daliot-Bul, “Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of ʻCool Japanʼ and the Challenges of Cultural 
Planning in a Postmodern Age,” Social Science Japan Journal Vol. 12, No. 2 , pp.247⊖266, 2009, p.253.
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briefly assumed at the turn of the 19th Century, when it...became a military and cultural 
power on its own terms（22）.” 
　The Cool Japan campaign was started with a budget of $371 million that was in-
creased to $ 1  billion by 2015, managed by the Cool Japan Fund, Inc. The campaign is 
a public-private initiative that will work closely with regional governments, towns, cit-
ies and banks to “pursue projects that show promise（2３）.” As an economic policy, Cool 
Japan officials aim to do for the creative industries what the former MITI experts had 
done for heavy industries in the post-war ear, i.e. pick “winners” and then protect and 
promote them. As a strategy to create soft power, official literature on Cool Japan pro-
claims, “Japan is a culture that appeals to the general population and that anyone can 
enjoy...We approach the creation of objects with a love for their beauty...At the root of 
this approach lies a spirit of harmony, which is evident in our philosophy of co-exist-
ence with nature（2４）.” Through Cool Japan, the image the Japanese state wants to project 
to the world is one of a nation with values worth emulating. 
　International exchange, of students and other types of people, is, for Nye, another 
part of public diplomacy that can enhance soft power. The most well known example 
of this type of diplomacy is the Japan Exchange and Teaching （JET） Program. 
Launched （in its current form） in 1987, the program invites thousands of young col-
lege graduates from English-speaking countries to live and work throughout Japan as 
assistant language teachers （ALTs） in elementary-, middle- and high schools, and in 
other roles with local authorities. The JET Program has grown larger than the Fulbright 
Program and the Peace Corps with a budget of about USD500 million（2５）. In a rather re-
（22）　Douglas McGray, “Japanʼs Gross National Cool,” Foreign Policy, November 11, 2009 http://
foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/11/japans-gross-national-cool/ （Downloaded on 06/28/2016 at 20:00 JST）
（23）　Kauaki Nagata, “Cool Japan Fund chief says crafty marketing key to regional revivals,” Japan Times, 
Dec. 29, 2013.  
（24）　From Embassy of Japan in the UK, cf. Daliot-Bul, p.253, footnote 8 .
（25）　David L. McConnell, “Japanʼs Image Problem and the Soft Power Solution: The JET Program as Cultur-
al Diplomacy,” Op.Cit., Soft Power Superpowers, p.19
東洋法学　第60巻第 1 号（2016年 7 月） 9７
（2５４）
markably open statement about the programʼs goals, a director from the Foreign Minis-
try division that oversees the JET Program said, “From the viewpoint of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, it is significant as a part of Japanʼs national security policy that these 
youths go back to their respective countries in the future and become sympathizers for 
Japan...［We］ consider the JET Programme is ［sic］ an extremely important and at the 
same time effective policy instrument（26）.” Writing in AERA magazine, Fukuda Shinʼ
ichi describes chance encounters with former JET participants during his travels across 
the United States and notes, with pleasant surprise, their knowledge of local Japanese 
lifestyles and customs and their fondness for Japan. He considers these anecdotes to be 
evidence of “Japanʼs long-term soft power strategy to form firm bonds of culture and 
international exchange.” （このような息の長いソフトパワー戦略こそが文化と国
際交流の固い絆（2７）.） In the eyes of both the state and observers, the JET Program is 
recognized as a foreign policy instrument designed to promote sympathetic feelings to-
ward Japanese society. Combining the governmentʼs definition of a global human re-
source （which includes someone who can both understand other cultures, while main-
taining a strong sense of being Japanese） and TGUʼs aim both to bring in more 
international faculty and students at the same time as dispatching more Japanese stu-
dents abroad （whose strong sense of identity will, presumably, enable them to serve as 
cultural ambassadors for their home country）, it is reasonable to consider TGU as a 
similar security strategy to the JET Program. 
　Whether or not TGU （or the Cool Japan campaign, for the matter） can succeed as a 
resource to increase Japanʼs soft power remains to be seen. It is too soon for any meas-
urable effects to make themselves apparent. Nyeʼs original idea came from his close 
study of nearly fifty years of Americaʼs global cultural influence in the post-war era and 
he concludes that, while pop culture can generate sympathy and fondness for a nation, 
（26）　The Jet Programme, cited in Ibid, p. 23
（27）　福田伸一、国際的事業「JET」で生粋の親日家が続々誕生 , Asahi Shimbun Weekly AERA, Sept. 2 , 
2013, p. 7
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it takes years, even decades, to obtain the desired outcome of coopting others. Nye also 
points out that the “effects of globalization depend on the receiver as well as the send-
er.” Information is not received in exactly the manner intended by the sender but “goes 
through cultural filters（28）.” However, after nearly 30 years, McConnell points out that 
studies of former JET participants reveal complex views toward Japan that some JET 
alumni have after they return to their home nations. A not-uncommon attitude, repre-
sented by an interviewee in McConnellʼs study, is one of admiration for certain things, 
e.g. of Japanese society, but “highly critical” of others, e.g. the Japanese government. 
As one alumnus told McConnell, “I now think of Japan as a delightful place of para-
doxes（29）.” Such a nuanced, but realistic view, could apply to most any society in the 
world. In this sense, the JET Program can be credited with promoting genuine interna-
tionalization. It hardly seems a stretch to predict that international teachers, researchers 
and students will return home with similarly nuanced perspectives thanks to their time 
in Japan as a direct- or indirect part of a TGU-sponsored program. 
　The nuanced view cited above may not be consistent with the governmentʼs desire to 
effect sympathy and fondness for Japan through a soft power strategy such as TGU. In 
fact, one of the criticisms of the concept of soft power is that it is is unilateral: While 
the resource itself is created by, and accumulated through, different media, the state re-
mains, or tries to remain, at the center as the agent exercising soft power. In this regard, 
Yonezawa is skeptical that TGU can even succeed as educational policy. “The approach 
is too bureaucratic and will lead to ineffective micromanagement. It is very important 
to give universities more autonomy so they can respond to global change（３0）.” Whatʼs 
more, the popularity of a countryʼs university system cannot make particular policies 
popular, as any American official working during the Vietnam or Iraq Wars could tell 
us. In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible to control the impact of culture and edu-
（28）　Op.Cit., Nye, p. 111
（29）　Op.Cit., McConnell, c.f. pp.26⊖27
（30）　Op.Cit., Bothwell
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cation outside of oneʼs own borders. Finally, soft power cannot be easily created or 
controlled by a state, nor can it be easily deployed. When addressing terrorist threats to 
Japanese people abroad, the prime minister of Japan cannot call up MEXT of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs （MOFA） and order the deployment of TGU faculty or students 
to coopt the aggressors. 
　However, in as much as soft power relies on the feelings of people toward another 
nation, then Japan would already seem to enjoy a high baseline upon which to embark 
upon the TGU project. More than any other nation, Japan is seen as “mostly positive” 
in a BBC World Service Poll that measures global attitudes toward nations. According 
to the results, 58 percent of people view Japan positively compared to a mere 22 per-
cent who see it negatively. Japan earns a higher positive and lower negative score than 
other countries with more universities in THE World Rankings top 200, such as Ger-
many （56％ positive, 16 negative）, the UK （51, 20）, France （48, 22） or the US （47, 
33）（３１）. Three of Japanʼs Asian neighbors, in particular, have a high regard for Japan. 
Pew Center data from 2013 show that Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines, at 80％ , 
79％ and 78％ percent, respectively, hold a favorable view of Japan. Only 6 ％ of Ma-
laysians report an unfavorable view of Japan, and less than twenty percent of Indone-
sians and Filipinos do（３2）. These results were recorded before the launching of either the 
Cool Japan campaign or the TGU project. 
　If we consider how TGU may develop as a soft power resource outside of, or in spite 
of, the stateʼs direction, then, as McConnell says of the JET Program, we may concep-
tualize it as a “smart foreign policy（３３）.” The TGU project will help selected universities 
（31）　“Views of US Continue to Improve in 2011 Country Rating Poll,” BBC World Service Poll http://www.
worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCEvalsUS_Mar11_rpt.pdf  （Downloaded on 01/152015 at 16:36 
JST）
（32）　“Japanese Publicʼs Mood Rebounding, Abe Highly Popular,” Pew Research Center, July 11, 2013, Pew 
Research Center Q 9 v, p. 5  http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/07/Pew-Research-Center-Global-
Attitudes-Project-Japan-Report-FINAL-July-11-2013.pdf （Downloaded on 01/15/2015 at 16:47 JST）
（33）　Op.Cit., McConnell, p.30
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develop networks with countries all over the world, which will foster relationships, 
scholarship and cooperation that could become a soft power resource. These connec-
tions could be the most important effect of TGU; not to persuade people to like Japa-
nese but to communicate with them（３４）. The fact that so many people worldwide seem 
predisposed to like Japan, already, would suggest less reason to see TGU as a foreign 
policy tool to be implemented from the top town than as a kind of public diplomacy 
with almost innumerable “diplomats.”
―H. Steven Green・法学部准教授―
（34）　Thomas Berger as cited in Op.Cit., McConnell, p.30. “The JET Program is not teaching people to like 
Japan so much as it is teaching them to communicate with Japanese.” （Italics in original.）
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